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INTRODUCTION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This special CBDS Working Paper originates from a longer-term collaboration between Associate 
Professors Søren Jeppesen, CBS and Andries Bezuidenhout, UFH. The collaboration started more than 
10 years ago and will have its main output with the forthcoming book (preliminary) titled: ENCLAVE 
DEVELOPMENT: STATE, MARKET, AND SOCIETY IN LESOTHO, SOUTH AFRICA AND 
SWAZILAND’S GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES. The collaboration has benefitted 
from primary and secondary data from two research projects and support from our institutions. The first 
project was part of a large research project, titled ‘The Outsourcing for Development project’, based at 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS) and Aalborg University, Denmark. The project was funded by the 
Danish Development Research Council and investigated different aspects of the contemporary situation 
among firms from developing countries in an era of globalisation and outsourcing of production from 
North to South. As part of a sub-study on ‘CSR, Development and Outsourcing’ we undertook a 
comparative investigation of the impact of codes of conduct on working conditions in garments in 
different countries in Southern Africa. The second project was part of a large comparative study on the 
role of Labour movements in Southern Africa, anchored at the Sociology at Work Unit, Witwatersrand 
University, South Africa. The project also supported the comparative study of the impact on codes of 
conduct, with funding from the Norwegian Development Agency (Norad). Over the years, our 
respective institutions (Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, later renamed 
Department of Management, Society and Communication (MSC) at CBS and Sociology of Work, Wits 
University, Department of Sociology, University of Pretoria and lastly Department of Development 
Studies (DDS), University of Fort Hare (UFH)) have supported us collegially and with funds for travel, 
student assistance and more. We highly appreciate this. 
 
This special CBDS Working Paper (no. 4 on Swaziland) along two other special CBDS WPs (no. 3 on 
Lesotho and no. 5 (to come) on South Africa) stems from the three so-called Country Background 
Notes (CBNs) drafted (one on each of the three countries included in the study). The intension of the 
CBNs has been to provide an overview of key elements of the economic, political and social contexts, 
which form an important part of the foundation for the comparative analysis of the development in the 
garment industry, including the similarities and difference among the countries and settings (See 
Bezuidenhout & Jeppesen forthcoming). Based on an overview of the present - and to some extent the 
past - situation of the countries, we will argue that a better (more in-depth and dynamic) understanding 
of the situation and of the responses that we have obtained from the local stakeholders in the garment 
industry is provided. By framing key issues relating to the garment industry, including states and 
industrial policies, the nature of the Global garment industry in a Global Production Network/Global 
Value Chain, the role of firms, unions and workers, we are able to better understand the situation in the 
firms and in the industry and the impact (or lack of same) of Codes on working conditions.  
 
During the project, we have benefitted from the work of numerous student and research assistants. 
They include; Lasse B. Jensen, Alvin P. Ljosa, Sameer Azizi, Amanda Haarman and Zartashia Ahmed 
(CBS), and Hamadziripi Tamukamoyo, Wits University (and other SA assistants). We would like to 
thank all for the great help. 
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1. LOCAL CONTEXT OF CASE STUDY - THE GARMENT INDUSTRY IN SWAZILAND 
a. Short history of the industry 
 
The history of Swaziland can be traced back to nomads migrating from what is now the Southern part of 
Mozambique to the Northern parts of the Zulu areas in KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. The conflicts 
with the powerful Zulus influenced the early history of the nation. The first British contact was made in 
order to get assistance against the Zulu raids. The British took incomplete colonial power over the nation 
from 1894 to 1899. After the Anglo-Boer war, the British managed to take full colonial power over the 
nation in 1906. The country became independent in 1968. 
 
Swaziland is a landlocked Southern African country of some 17 500 km². It is mostly surrounded by 
South Africa, but shares a border with Mozambique in the East (see the map below). It has a population 
of 1.3 million as of 2016, and is Africa’s last remaining absolute monarchy, ruled by King Mswati III1.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Swaziland with main industrial areas indicated 
 
Source: Mainfacts.com 
 
1 Swaziland’s King, Mswati III, has recently changed the country’s name to eSwatini. The King announced the change 
during the celebrations to mark 50 years of independence from British rule. The word “Swaziland” itself is an English 
translation of the Swazi people’s own name for the nation, eSwatini, meaning “land of the Swazis”. 
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The garment industry in Swaziland is younger and smaller compared to the neighbouring countries of 
South Africa and Lesotho. Until the 1990’s, the garment industry was poorly developed and Swaziland 
was a (small) export market for South African retailers (Madonsela 2006). However, the opportunities 
that arose from access to the US market through the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) (De 
Haan & van der Stichele 2007: 31) were conducive to major change. In 1998 and through the passing of 
the Swaziland Investment Promotion Act, the Government of Swaziland (GoS) formed the Swaziland 
Investment Promotion Agency (SIPA) aiming to facilitate and promote foreign and local investment in 
Swaziland. 
 
Swaziland’s open-market approach attracted foreign direct investments (FDI) primarily by Taiwanese 
companies. Due to diplomatic difficulties, they directed their investments to Swaziland instead of South 
Africa (Tati 2005). In numbers, 95 percent of the FDI came from Taiwanese companies and the rest from 
South Africa and other Asian countries. They therefore played a major role in the early development of 
the industry (de Haan & van der Stichel 2007: 31), which peaked in 2004 with more than 40 garment 
firms in Swaziland and about 40,000 persons employed in the industry. Compared to high unemployment 
and poverty rates and a population of 1.3 million (World Bank Data – www.worldbank.org), 40,000 jobs 
in the garment industry were significant. Nevertheless, due to a number of factors the garment industry 
declined to an estimated 16 operations employing around 18,000 workers when we visited the country 
the first time in September 2008. This study found that, out of the 16 companies operating in the garment 
industry in 2008, 12 were Taiwanese owned, 2 were South African owned, 1 was Canadian and only 1 
was half Taiwanese and half Swazi ownership. With an increase in the number of South African firms in 
the country, the industry has since regained some of the losses in employment. The jobs provided 
accounted for almost half of the employment opportunities in the country’s manufacturing sector (see 
later in this section).  
 
The main reason for the dramatic changes in the mid-2000s was the expiration of the Multi Fibre 
Agreement (MFA)/WTO Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) and the quota-limits in 2005. The 
phase out of the MFA meant that exports from China and other Asian countries gained importance 
compared to Swaziland. Contributing to this was a major change in the exchange rate - not only in 
Swaziland, but in the whole South African region. The Swaziland’s currency – the Lilangeni – is closely 
tied to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) Rand. When the Rand appreciated to 30 percent against the 
US dollar, this led to an increase in export-prices from the region. Meanwhile, Asian currencies were 
7 
 
tied to the US dollar and followed the currency fluctuation of the US dollar, eventually giving them a 
better competitive position. Besides these macro-economic and political factors, Swaziland has had a 
poor track record on labour rights, which has led to the country being expelled from AGOA in January 
2015 - and then admitted back into AGOA in 2018. Finally, the somewhat disadvantaged location of the 
country gives relatively high costs of transport and long lead times compared to numerous other 
countries.  
 
A number of the Taiwanese companies present in the industry at an earlier stage were part of big Asian 
conglomerates operating based on a global production network strategy. The AGOA benefits combined 
with the MFA regulations and incentives provided by the Swazi government (see below) led to their 
focus on Swaziland. However, when the MFA/ATC benefits diminished, in most cases, the Taiwanese 
closed their operations almost overnight, without paying the workers their wages (de Haan & van der 
Stichel 2007: 25, 39). The mechanisms behind the Taiwanese “footloose investments” are multiple in a 
global industry where both US retailers and foreign investors are requiring lower prices, shorter delivery 
times, and (sometimes) higher quality. Such competition eventually results in a “race to the bottom”. 
 
Over the years, the importance of the US market has shifted as an increasing number of South African 
investors have entered the industry. Traditionally, the US market has been Swaziland’s major export 
market for this industry. Supported by AGOA, exports to the US accounted for US$ 65 million in 2001 
and peaked to US$ 199 million in 2004. However, since then, export from Swaziland to the US market 
decreased significantly to US$ 156 million in 2006, US$ 145 million in 2007, and a stagnation to about 
US$ 21 million in 2017 (AGOA.info – www.agoa.info.dk). As the numbers show, Swaziland’s ultimate 
exclusion from AGOA in 2015 hit the industry hard. Losing access to the US market caused a dramatic 
drop in export earnings (textiles and textile products) by 6.5 percent to E 2.303 billion in 2015 alone. In 
that year, South Africa became Swaziland’s main export market for textile products (Central Bank of 
Swaziland 2016/17). It resulted in massive unemployment and a sharp decline in volume of traded goods 
to the US (see also figure 2 below). However, the Central Bank of Swaziland (2017/18) has high 
expectations for the re-instatement of AGOA. 
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Figure 2: Swaziland-US trade in goods (2000-2017) 
 
Source: agoa.info 
 
Today, the South African market is the second biggest export market with the main advantage of 
proximity. South African firms now represent a significant part of the garment industry in a number of 
operations, though on average it is smaller in scale and hence still minor in volume output and 
employment compared to the Taiwanese firms. 
 
Geographically, most of the garment firms are located in the Matsapha industrial area near Manzini – the 
main industrial area in Swaziland (De Haan & van der Stihele 2007: 31) (see the map in Figure 1 above). 
In our study (in 2008) of 16 garment operations, 12 were located in the Matsapha Industrial estate. Apart 
from Matsampha area, there is a cluster of four factories at Nhlangano in the South of the country. This 
area became a hub for garment operations mainly due to a Taiwanese investor from South Africa who, 
in 1999, relocated some of his operations to Swaziland due to crime and labour unrest in South Africa. 
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He established another operation in 2000, and in 2001 his brother in law followed suit. A total number 
of 4 of the 16 operations in our research were located in this area. Before the industry setback in 2004, 
the government’s strategy was to move its industrial operations to rural areas such as Nhlangano and 
Siphofaneni, but the move was not successful as the infrastructure in these areas are limited and the 
operational costs are too high (Madonsela 2006: 249).  
More recent counts state that there are 13 garment operations (9 Taiwanese-owned, 3 South African-
owned and 1 locally-owned) and 3 textile mills in Swaziland. Apart from these operations, there are 
several very small-scale operations across the country (individual tailors or workshops). These small 
tailors/workshops are very different from the larger foreign-owned exporting operations in terms of 
inputs and production and there is no interaction between them (Staritz & Frederick 2016).  
 
b. Current situation, incentives and facilitation 
 
The garment industry in Swaziland continues to be driven by the AGOA opportunities, in spite of the 
long-dragged threats of being expelled from the AGOA (and the country’s eventual exclusion in 2015), 
the currency fluctuations, location cost issues, and the growing importance of RSA firms. The uncertainty 
regarding the status of the AGOA (being part or not) has led to a weak competitive position of the 
industry vis-à-vis the “footloose” investors and firms (in particular the ones coming from Taiwan as 
outlined above).  
 
The primary focus of the government in Swaziland has been on provision of incentives to attract FDI to 
the industry, and thus not prioritizing local investors (Tati 2008). These incentives range from easing 
trade agreements with partner countries, smoothening bureaucratic procedures with the government, to 
financial incentives such as tax reduction, duty-free import of manufacturing technology and raw 
material (De Haan & van der Stihele 2007: 33). SIPA, a parastatal, was established in 1998 to attract FDI 
to the country, facilitate growth of domestic companies and support the enabling of a sound business 
environment. SIPA’s focus on creating incentives to attract FDI without considering the long-term and 
sustainable consequences has led to the attraction of Taiwanese companies that can be characterized as 
“footloose investors”. Their company closures were rapid and without any consideration of the 
consequences that it has for the workers. In most cases operations were closed on a day-to-day basis and 
workers were not paid their wages (De Haan & van der Stichele 2007: 25, 39).  
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The mechanisms behind these “footloose investments” are multiple and emblematic of a global industry 
where both US retailers and foreign investors are requiring lower costs, eventually resulting in a “race to 
the bottom”.  
 
The vulnerability and footloose character of the garment industry also relates to the inability of SIPA and 
the Swazi government to create incentives to attract FDI of a longer-term and more sustainable nature. It 
has prevented Swaziland to reap the benefits from any significant spillovers of the incoming Taiwanese 
FDI. Apart from the output from the textile mills, all other fabrics needed for the industry are for instance 
imported from Asian countries, without efforts on developing a (strong) local market to source fabrics 
within the country. The garment industry shows limited signs of embeddedness with only little 
fabrication of cloth and inputs taking place within the country. Moreover, SIPA has neither attempted to 
build local skills, nor pushed the foreign investors to prioritize this. The transfer of skills from the foreign 
companies has been low as most of the operations were run by expatriates (De Haan & van der Stichele 
2007: 31). This has fuelled dependence on FDI and on managerial skills from outside the country. A 
recent study confirms that expatriates take up most technical, production, and management positions (79 
percent), but more local line supervisors are found today. They are typically in charge of human 
resources, machine maintenance, and communication issues (Staritz & Frederick 2016).  
 
The main spill-over effect of the garment investments has been on the transportation sector; the 
government has invested a good amount to improve the infrastructure, such as road networks, around 
Matsapha’s industrial area and the large number of employees living around the site meant an increase 
in clients. Moreover, investments in the garment industry have an impulse to local street vendors and 
small retail outlets in the informal economy (Madonsela 2006: 252). 
 
SIPA markets the country as a “safe, secure ...’ and with a ‘competitively priced work force” (SIPA 
2019). The word “safe” refers to a much lower crime rate than its South African neighbour. The South 
African managers we interviewed were proud to point out that they had experienced very little crime. 
Nevertheless, some of the houses in Ezulwini, where members of the expatriate managerial class prefer 
to reside, have high walls and electric fences. This settlement is conveniently located halfway in between 
the major centres of Mbabane and Manzini, and is also the heartland of Swazi tourism industry with its 
hotels, casinos and golf courses. The settlement also sports a shopping centre (“Gables”), with a Pam 
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Golding (an elite South African estate agent) office, a Pick ‘n Pay supermarket, a homely coffee shop, a 
bottle store with upmarket wines from the Western Cape, as well as a number of restaurants.    
 
The word “secure” refers to the business-friendly approach of the Swazi government. The political elite 
has never been “contaminated” by the socialist rhetoric of many post-colonial African governments. 
Rather than expropriating land from settlers, King Sobhuza II used a trust fund called Tibiyo 
TakaNgwane to buy back land on behalf of the Swazi nation, which the monarch holds “in trust”. There 
is a thriving sugar cane farming business on much of this land, of which Tibiyo is the majority 
shareholder. Finally, investments are secure because they are protected from “undue expropriation” 
according to the Swaziland Investment Promotion Act of 1998 (SIPA 2007: 12-13). This is particularly 
important given the experiences of private capital in countries such as Zimbabwe. Despite low threats of 
expropriation, the US Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs’ Investment Climate Statements of 2017 
however does regard Swaziland’s investment climate as, “less welcoming of U.S. investment due to 
increased government bureaucracy, corruption, and the higher costs associated with doing business in 
Swaziland” (U.S. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2017). In terms of the overall ease of doing 
business in Swaziland, the World Bank has ranked the country at 58.95, where 100 represents the best 
performance. Moreover, the international community has cast Swaziland as an “unfriendly investor” 
destination in the past, where capital is subject to the whims of the government and may expropriate 
private property to advance the living conditions of the local population (U.S. Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs 2018).   
 
The words “competitively priced work forces” refer to the incentives described above, but also, more 
controversially, to Swaziland’s low wages and several measures used to keep unions in line. Since much 
of the opposition against the tinkundla regime (see below) of King Mswati III comes from the labour 
movement, industrial relations are characterized to be highly politicized (see e.g. Solidarity Center 2006). 
 
c. Laws and regulations governing the garment industry 
 
The garment industry is regulated by a number of laws, including the ones mentioned above. These 
include the ‘Wages act of 1964’ and ‘Regulation of Wages in the Textile and Apparel industry from 
2004’, which states a minimum wage of E139 per week, but have since 2004 not always been complied 
due to the cost-reducing pressure from retailers (Madonsela 2006: 254). 
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Furthermore, the Employment Act, 1980 is important with regards to working conditions (see also 
below). The Employment Act, 1980 lives up to all the international aspects of the international labour 
organization’s (ILO) core conventions, including no child labour, no discrimination, and allowing 
freedom of association. Nevertheless, the labour law only specifies the maximum working hours for 
domestic workers to be 48 normal hours and 11 hours of overtime pr. week. Despite having labour laws 
in place that are in line with international standards, their enforcement is generally weak. This means that 
the actual number of inspections are lower than the supposed number, and foreign observers rather than 
Government inspectors have identified often poor standards. 
 
The Wages act of 1964 and Regulation of Wages in the Textile and Apparel industry from 2004 dictate 
a minimum wage of E139 per week (the equivalent of US$ 10.28 per 2018), but garment companies have 
since 2004 not always complied due to the cost-reducing pressure from retailers (Madonsela 2006: 254). 
Given the challenging environment, the unions and workers face severe obstacles in enhancing working 
conditions in relation to; minimum wages compliance; legal sick leave and maternity leave compliance; 
job security and instable income; health and safety of workers; recognition of unions among companies 
requiring 50 percent plus one membership; and finally, for HIV/AIDS issues (De Haan & van der Stichele 
2007: 37).  
 
In regards to HIV/AIDS, an estimated 27.4 percent of adults are affected by HIV as of 2017 (UNAIDS 
– https://www.unaids.org). However, the government has no specific laws to protect the HIV/AIDS 
affected workers from discrimination. In the worst case, this means dismissal from work and thereby 
life-threatening circumstances for these workers (Solidarity Center 2006: 47). The prospect of changes 
required by the unions seems limited. Frequent surveillance of security officers and victimisation of 
union leaders make it impossible for unions to protect workers’ rights (Ibid.). Finally, simple issues like 
language seems to be problematic, as the Taiwanese employers and trade union members (and workers 
in general) have difficulties communicating in English (Madonsela 2006: 256). 
 
Supported by the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) and the Amalgamated Trade Union 
of Swaziland (ATUSWA), workers in the garment industry have been campaigning for minimum wages 
in 2018, which in practice would mean doubling their income (most earn E 1 300 and E 1 500 per month, 
which is the equivalent of about US$ 90 – US$ 100). They are demanding a minimum wage of at least 
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E 3 000 (about US$250) per month (Zwane 2018 – see below too). The trade unions are engaged in an 
uphill struggle, as they not only are in opposition to the king, but are dealing with tough demands (50% 
representation in the factories in order to take up negotiations with the employers) while at the same time 
having internal competition among the unions in terms of organizing members (see Section 2.c below). 
 
It was the Industrial Relations Act of 2000 that was decisive to losing its AGOA status in 2015 (along 
with the Suppression of Terrorism Act and the Public Order Act). Swaziland had been under watch of 
the ILO for a general lack of legal recognition for labour and employer federations, in particular 
concerning freedom of association, assembly, and speech. Some of the concerns that were raised by the 
ILO were attended to through amendments of the Industrial Relations Act of 2000 resulting in the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 2014. The government – passing the bill just before the 
deadline of the next AGOA evaluation cycle – hoped these amendments would save AGOA status, but 
was unsuccessful. Swaziland lost its AGOA status on January 1st 2015, as not enough progress had been 
made. Swaziland was not reinstated as AGOA beneficiary until 2018 (Ndlangamandla 2017).  
 
Swaziland offers a generous framework of incentives to foreign investors, designed and implemented by 
SIPA. To name a few: it takes under a month and only USD 500 to establish a company and obtain the 
necessary licences, there are no import duties on capital goods and raw materials for productive 
investments, and foreign investors enjoy a reduced tax rate at 10 percent (instead of 27.5 percent) for the 
first 10 years. On top of these incentives, all profits, expatriate salaries and dividends can be repatriated, 
and human resource training costs can be written off against tax. Finally, by lowering trade barriers to 
export markets in the US, AGOA - although not a Swazi government-granted incentive - has been an 
important reason for Taiwanese investors to set up operations in Swaziland (Tati 2005). Most recently, 
with the passing of the disputed Special Economic Zones (SEZ)2 Bill of 2017, Swaziland now offers a 
tax holiday to operations that set up in the Special Economic Zones around King Mswati III International 
Airport and at the Royal Science and Technology Parks. Investors (both foreign and domestic) are given 
an initial 20-year corporate tax holiday, after which they pay 5 percent tax only. 
 
 
2 Although Swaziland did not create any official Special Economic Zones (SEZ) or Special Exporting Zones before (in 
contrary to Lesotho that has hosted special Export Processing Zones), the enclave-state of the industry was already apparent 
at the time of our field study and interviews field in 2008. The planned special zones following the passing of the Special 
Economic Zones Bill 2017 therefore seem more of a strategy to legitimize the renegotiation of FDI conditions, rather than a 
economic development strategy.   
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While AGOA and the government-granted FDI-incentives are, in theory, aimed at giving a positive 
impulse to the Swazi economy, practice shows how the Taiwanese investors are the largest beneficiaries, 
owing AGOA its nick-name “Asian Growth and Opportunity Act”. Taiwanese investment is argued to 
be opportunistically aimed at gaining lucrative market access to the US (rather than concerned with 
upgrading the local economy) (Tati 2008). The local press expresses strong disappointment and blame 
the government for missing a “cohesive strategy for taking advantage of AGOA”. Garment workers have 
benefitted very little from foreign investments in the industry other than their meagre salaries argued to 
be “keeping workers just busy enough to reduce the potential for civil unrest” (Zwane 2018). Moreover, 
local investors are excluded from AGOA-related benefits as no efforts have been made to create linkages 
between foreign investors and locally owned micro-enterprises (Tati 2008). 
 
The Ministry of Commerce Industry & Trade hosts a Small and Medium sized Enterprise (SMME) Unit 
that is charged with promoting and stimulating development of the SME sector. Although small 
enterprises are seen as vital to economic growth and important to create employment, the number of 
SMEs in Swaziland is very low compared to South Africa and Lesotho. In his budget speech of 2018, 
the Minister of Finance Martin G. Dlamini specifically mentioned SME development by referring to a 
recent survey on SMEs in Swaziland: “The Swaziland MSME National Survey 2017” by FinScope3. The 
survey, aimed at determining the performance of the sector, showed that (according to the Minister) “only 
10 percent of the adult population owns a business”, which he ascribes to limited “entrepreneurial spirit”. 
The government, therefore, devises incentives to encourage new businesses creation with special 
attention to a loan scheme for graduates (aligned with the Graduate Enterprise Programme) (Dlamini 
2018). Earlier surveys (e.g. from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) had already established the 
relatively low number. However, the primary explanation is lack of (access to) finance, followed by lack 
of fundamental business skills and competitiveness (Makhubu 2016 2017). 
 
The current National Policy on the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises drafted by the 
Ministry of Commerce Industry & Trade dates back to 2004. The policy does not mention the garment 
industry in particular, most probably because the industry is dominated by large and largely foreign 
operations. It does, however, express the need to create linkages between large and small businesses and 
promises to establish a business linkage centre to “encourage stronger integration between large and 
 
3 The FinScope survey is conducted by a South-African based donor-funded independent trust called FinMark 
(https://finmark.org.za/) 
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small sectors of the economy” to benefit indigenous businesses (local capacity and skills transfer). It does 
specify foreign operations apart from South African companies (Ministry of Commerce Industry & Trade 
2004). Currently (mid 2018), the Ministry is revising the 2004 SMME policy, but the content is yet 
unknown apart from a continued focus on youth through access to special funds and programmes (the 
Junior Achievement, ENACTUS, and KickStart programmes) (Nkonyana 2018).  
d. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Codes of Conduct  
 
The above-mentioned situation in the country has led to limited attention to the working conditions in 
the garment industry in Swaziland. While state regulations have not been strongly enforced, neither have 
voluntary initiatives like CSR and codes of conduct. Though the firms exporting to the US are supposed 
to have codes of conduct in place, we found limited signs of implementation at the time of our field 
studies. Similarly, we did not come across many signs of inspections of such codes in the country. We 
did find some differences between the Asian/Taiwanese firms and the RSA firms on this account. As 
part of the activities of the Swazi Textiles Exporters Association (STEA), the Asian firms did at some 
point lobby for less stringent labour laws and standards. In contrast, the RSA firms seemed less concerned 
about this and found that regulations and wages were adequate, one reason was that the influence of 
unions was more limited compared to RSA. 
 
The “footloose investments” in the industry have further pressured workers’ bargaining power towards 
companies. The question seems to be whether codes of conduct and other CSR initiatives from large 
export-retailers can provide opportunities for improving working conditions in the industry in Swaziland 
(Bezuidenhout & Jeppesen forthcoming).4 However, many of them (both managers and workers) have 
for years feared that the companies will close down if certain requirements for working conditions are 
demanded (De Haan & van der Stichele 2007: 37). Working conditions, especially in the Asian-owned 
companies, are noted to be severely problematic.  
e. Current challenges 
 
If the industry is to grow and create more employment, the main challenges for the Swazi garment 
industry are to overcome different internal and external issues. Some of the factors are general in nature 
and affect all parties in the industry, while other factors relate to the position of the operations in the 
 
4 To date, the companies operating in Swaziland have not introduced codes of conduct directly. Some of them do 
nevertheless offer garments made out of sustainable products such as bamboo and organic cotton (e.g. Tex-Ray). 
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global value chains (GVCs) of the garment industry and their main market (whether US or RSA). The 
challenges that Swaziland currently faces (as of 2018) can be broken down into several aspects that are 
strongly interlinked: 
 
First of all, AGOA is of critical importance to the Swazi garment industry. AGOA contributed (along 
with other factors) as mentioned above to the huge growth in industry up to 2005, but it has also created 
a heavy dependence on the preferential trade agreement and made the industry subject to the will and 
power of the US (the country has one-sided power to revoke preferences of any of the beneficiaries). The 
industry’s vulnerability became clear when Swaziland was (temporarily) suspended from AGOA benefits 
in 2015 - after a failure to address concerns about worker rights - and exports plumped and unemployment 
soared as a consequence.  
 
Secondly, ever since Swaziland’s admission to AGOA in 2000, the industry has lacked local ownership 
creating a second vulnerability: overdependence on FDI - or more specifically on Taiwanese investments. 
Taiwanese investors are attracted to Swaziland for little else than preferential market access to the US 
through AGOA (and Swaziland’s ill reputed low wages, see the third point below). The opportunistic 
presence of the numerous Taiwanese-owned operations in Swaziland became evident in the aftermath of 
the 2015 suspension. When the AGOA benefits ceased, trade volume declined and massive layoffs 
followed, causing a “near-collapse” of the garment industry (Zwane 2018). This highlights the 
vulnerability of the industry similar to the fluctuations in the industry around 2004-2005 (see above). 
 
A third issue that stands out is the industry’s labour conditions (in specific: low wages) that are used by 
the government as a way to attract FDI, but evidently proved an unsustainable strategy. The industry has 
a history of exploitation where Taiwanese factory owners pay salaries that workers describe as “slave 
wages” (Swazi Media Commentary 2014). Swaziland has a particular bad reputation when it comes to 
industrial relations and in particular the lack of freedom to unionize and protest (which cost the country 
their AGOA membership, which was only reinstated after parliament passed certain amendments to the 
Industrial Relations Act). Unions (TUCOSWA and ATUSWA) have organized numerous campaigns and 
strikes to attain decent working conditions and wages; however, workers are demotivated to join unions 
as their Taiwanese employers are threating not to pay their wages (Swazi Media Commentary 2018). 
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Finally - and where all comes together – the local economy including workers and local firms have not 
profited from foreign investments in the garment industry. There are no implemented programs in place 
to reap the benefits from FDI, which leaves Swaziland with very limited lasting effects on the economy 
after nearly two decades of AGOA. Despite the government’s discourse on the importance of creating 
linkages between large and smaller firms in the economy, foreign firms and the SME sector operate in 
parallel. The garment industry has developed into an enclave (Bezuidenhout & Jeppesen forthcoming). 
The recent plans of the government to create SEZs near King Mswati III International Airport and at the 
Royal Science and Technology Parks will most likely further isolate the industry from the wider Swazi 
economy. Since the main share of the industry’s operations is Taiwanese owned, and FDI conditions 
allow operations to repatriate profits, and send dividends and salaries back home, Swaziland is left 
‘empty handed’ (Zwane 2018).  
 
f. Summary remarks 
 
In spite of some South African companies having established production in Swaziland, this had not 
happened nearly to the extent found in Lesotho (see e.g. Jeppesen & Bezuidenhout forthcoming). 
Accordingly, the industry continues to be reliant on the Taiwanese companies, which notwithstanding 
some diversification of sales into South Africa and the European Union still remain focused on the US 
market through AGOA. As the employment level is lower and much more modest compared to the peak 
in 2004, the benefits to Swaziland and the population are significantly lower than earlier. 
 
These changes in the industry are affecting vulnerable population groups such as low-skilled women and 
men in Swaziland. The “race to the bottom” has, despite governmental incentives to attract FDI to the 
country, led to a harsh working environment for Swazi workers, where legal worker rights are not 
complied, and where unions’ positions are purposely weakened. Although Swaziland has ratified United 
Nation’s human and worker rights, international labour organization’s (ILO) fundamental conventions, 
and adopted regional instruments to improve workers’ rights, compliance to these has been problematic 
over the years (Solidarity Centre 2006: 17; The Economist 2016). The current constitution in Swaziland 
is formulated purposely without the influence of the unions, and consists of elements that neglects 
freedom of association (The Economist 2016). Unions tend to be discriminated and harassed, and 
blacklisting of union members are legally possible (Solidary Center 2006: 31). In general, the workers in 
Swaziland are suffering from fragility that is created as a consequence of ruling monarch governance and 
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its cultural discourse, which can frame any activist reaction from the unions as “unSwazi” (Simelane 
2008: 463). 
 
The Swazi economy urgently needs to be restructured in order to address the key challenges found in 
terms of widespread poverty, high levels of unemployment and a limited manufacturing industry and in 
particular a weak locally owned industry in garments. Some of the main areas to deal with include: a) 
the currency volatilities to the South African Rand, b) the taxation system, and in particular a potential 
increase in the level of corporate tax (at the risk of losing FDI), c) upgrading of infrastructure such as the 
electricity grid, and the improvement of the transport networks such as roads, and d) diversification of 
the economy. 
 
Finally, the government could also play an important role in the enforcement of labour rights and civil 
liberties, which could go a long way in fostering an increased level of unity and patriotism. The latter is 
very important given the large number of Swazis who choose to invest their wealth outside the country. 
It does, however, seem unlikely that the government will play a role in improving labour conditions and 
industrial relations in favour of workers, when it would harm the Taiwanese investors’ interests. During 
the most recent state visit of Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen to Swaziland, she signed an agreement 
with King Mswati III for improved cooperation and the expansion of investments beyond the garment 
industry (mentioned are: biotechnology, tourism). Underlying their good relationship is Swaziland’s 
“long-term support [of Taiwan] in the international arena” (Hsu 2018: 1). 
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2. ECONOMIC SITUATION, INDUSTRIAL SECTOR & LABOUR ISSUES 
 
a. Economic system  
 
Historically, Swaziland’s economy has been closely tied to that of neighbouring South Africa in terms 
of trade and currency. Its currency, the Lilangeni (plural: Emelangeni), is linked to the Rand and is 
exchanged on a 1:1 basis, as in the case of Namibia and Lesotho. This makes the economy and the 
currency “vulnerable to Rand exchange volatility” (Madonsela 2006: 247). The country is a member of 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
as well as the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), which allows producers in the 
country to access major African trading blocs. The Swazi economy is very vulnerable to external shocks 
and has been suffering from prolonged droughts, high oil prices and loss of specific beneficial conditions 
for garment exports to the US (Bezuidenhout & Jeppesen forthcoming).
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Table 1: Major Economic Indicators (2000-2016) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GDP per capita, current 
prices (USD per capita) 1872 1651 1511 2308 2894 3255 3321 3456 3254 3498 4267 4572 4404 4046 3890 3511 3343,14 
Real GDP growth 
(Annual % change) 2,6 1,5 3,6 4,4 3,7 5,5 5,2 3,9 2,8 4,5 3,5 2 3,5 4,8 3,6 1,1 0 
Inflation rate, average 
consumer prices 
(Annual % change) 12,2 5,9 12 7,3 3,4 1,8 5,2 8,1 12,7 7,4 4,5 6,1 8,9 5,6 5,7 5 8 
                  
Sectors share of GDP 
(%)                   
Agriculture 12,8 12,7 13,2 13,0 10,1 11,4 11,6 11,2 10,4 9,7 10,6 10,2 11,0 11,0 10,1 10,2 10,0 
Industry 41,1 41,4 41,4 40,3 41,6 41,4 41,4 42,0 41,3 41,7 39,5 38,6 39,6 38,2 38,2 38,1 37,5 
Services 46,1 45,9 45,5 46,7 48,4 47,2 47,0 46,9 48,2 48,6 49,9 51,2 49,3 50,8 51,7 51,6 52,4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Employment to 
population ratio (%) 37,8 37,3 38,4 38,2 38,1 37,3 36,5 35,6 36 36,1 36,5 37 37 37,8 38,3 39 39 
Source: The World Factbook (2017)  
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Table 1 above shows a range of economic indicators for the period 2000-2016. Although, the GDP 
per capita at current prices shows a significant increase of 78.5 percent from 2000 to 2016, the 
development is uneven with years of decline too. While GDP growth in real terms ranges from 3.5 
up to 5.5 percent per year in most years, the fluctuations means that considerable lower levels of 
growth are found in between. 
 
The shares of GDP measured by sector in Swaziland reveals that the primary sector contributed with 
10 percent of the total GDP, the secondary sector contributed with 37.5 percent and the tertiary sector 
contributed with 52.4 percent in 2016 (The World Factbook). The secondary sectors’ contribution 
has been relatively stable in the first part of the period (2000 to 2007) before it then shows a decline 
from 2008 onwards. The primary sector has also showed a decline of 2.8 percent in the period 2000 
to 2016 and again with some fluctuations over time. Finally, the tertiary sector has shown a modest 
increase, in particular from 2007 onwards (IMF Country Report No. 08/355 2018).  
 
Since 2005, Swaziland has received relative low levels of FDI compared to the period until 2005. In 
2007, Swaziland received 37 million dollars in FDI equivalent to 7.5 percent of the total GFCF, while 
in 2016, FDI was equivalent to around 27 million dollars (The World Factbook). This decrease in 
FDI is mainly due to limited new investments in the garment sector. The FDI stock is of 889 million 
dollars equivalent to 30.3 percent of the GDP (UNCTAD 2008). The 2016 sectoral analysis of FDI 
shows that the manufacturing sector is the leading contributor to the total stock of FDI, accounting 
for 70.5 percent of the total FDI stock (Central Bank of Swaziland 2015/2016). Table 2 below shows 
the total FDI into Swaziland by sector in million emalangeni.  
 
Table 2: Total FDI into Swaziland by sector, 2011-2015, (E’million) 
Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014* 2015# 
Change Stock Change 
(%) 
Stock Change 
(%) 
Stock Change 
(%) 
Stock Change 
(%) 
Manufacturing 15.0 4,298,8 -3.4 4,977.6 15.8 4,633.4 -6.9 5,687.9 22.8 
Services 28.0 916.1 -8.7 903.8 -1.3 1,111.3 23.0 753.3 -32.2 
Investment -10.9 196.3 9.2 215.0 9.5 293.9 36.7 465.4 58.4 
Agriculture 63.9 1,792.7 70.1 1,247.8 -30.4 98.6 -92.1 56.2 -43.0 
Finance 17.5 720.8 6.3 705.1 -2.2 539.5 -23.5 993.1 84.1 
Mining -8.5 220.4 249.6 183.1 -16.9 457.2 149.6 110.3 -75.9 
Source: Central Bank of Swaziland: Annual Report 2015/16 
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However, the total inflow of FDI has been decreasing since the financial crisis. In 2008 the total 
inflows of FDI was measured at no less than US$ 105 million. This has however fallen to US$ 27 
million in 2016 (IMF, supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development and official national sources). The slowdown in inflow of FDI also demonstrates the 
fierce competition in the region in attracting foreign direct investment to individual countries. Also 
noteworthy is that at time more than half of the total FDI has taken place through reinvested earning, 
e.g. showing an increase of 14 percent in 2007. The increase was largely because of expansions, 
upgrading and new projects undertaken by companies in various sectors (Central Bank of Swaziland 
2007/2008). This indicated a commitment from the companies already operating in Swaziland. In 
2010, the reinvested earnings accounted for 42.4 percent of the total stock of FDI in 2012 (Trading 
Economics – www.tradingeconomics.com).  
 
To attract more companies, the Swazi government exempts newly established foreign owned 
companies from taxes on the profits made in Swaziland. Before the passing of the SEZ Act of 2018, 
the exemption was granted for a period of 10 years. Today, companies are except from paying any 
taxes in Swaziland for the first 20 years if settled at the Royal Science and Technology Park and the 
King Mswati III International Airport, which have been declared SEZs. After the 20-year period, 
foreign companies pay after a mere 5 percent (Dhladhla 2018). There is no data available on the total 
profits made by foreign companies and the amount repatriated. But it shows in the figures for FDI 
that the amount of reinvested earnings is increasing. In 2015, Swaziland’s FDI stock increased to E 
8.098 billion (a 12.2 percent increase from 2014), mainly due to the reinvested earnings component 
(20.9 percent increase to E 6.403 billion) (Central Bank of Swaziland 2015/2016). Though, 
Madonsela (2006) states that this is not the case of the Swazi garment industry, the figures show that, 
despite tax holidays, not all of the profits are repatriated. 
 
The Swazi economy has at times been marked by a high level of inflation. The inflation rate was 
measured at 13.3 percent in 2008 (until July), going up from 12.6 percent in 2007. In the period from 
2003 to 2006 the average inflation rate was of 4.9 percent all while the inflation rate in South Africa 
during the same period was only 3.3 percent (IMF Country Report No. 08/355 2008). In the period 
2017-2018, the inflation rate has decreased from 6 percent (until March) and down to 4 percent in 
February 2018 (see table 3 below).  
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Table 3: Swaziland’s inflation rate March 2017- February 2018 
Period Inflation rate in % 
March 2017 6 
April 2017 7 
May 2017 7,1 
June 2017 6.9 
July 2017 6.7 
August 2017 5.9 
September 2017 5.4 
October 2017 5.4 
November 2017 4.9 
December 2017 4.7 
January 2018 4.6 
February 2018 4 
Source: Trading Economics (2018a) 
 
Swaziland receives remittances from workers employed in foreign countries. In 2011 the official 
amount of remittances received was US$ 38 equivalent to 0.79 percent of the total GDP (US$ 4.82 
billion (World Bank Group 2016). This has however decreased to US$ 25 (0.62 percent of the GDP, 
i.e. US$ 4.02 billion (World Bank Group 2016) in 2015. The real level of remittances may however 
be higher than the official figure given that several informal channels have been found to send 
remittances. The percentage of the population that has emigrated is 9.3 percent. Many of the people 
emigrate to South Africa or Mozambique. Studies show that 5.8 percent of the people receiving 
tertiary education emigrate from Swaziland (World Bank Group 2016). 
 
Swaziland has a foreign population of 25.500, equivalent to 2 percent of the total population 
(measurement from 2013). Immigrants mainly come from South Africa and Mozambique. The total 
immigrant population sends out US$ 9 to their home country. The outflow of remittances has seen a 
huge decline between 2002 and 2016 from 39 to 10.4 million dollars (World Bank Group 2016).       
 
Economic and industrial policies 
The present economic policy is still centred on achieving growth through openness toward foreign 
investments in the country and on building export-oriented industries. The Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development developed the ‘National Development Strategy (NDS): Vision 2022’ in 
1997 to set the frame for the development of the country for the next 25 years. The plan should act as 
an overall guideline for all other sub-policies and as a managerial tool for fostering development. The 
strategy paper is focused around key macro-economic issues and specific sectoral strategies, such as 
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public-sector management, infrastructure, agricultural, rural development, economic services, 
education, health and social welfare. However, as a Swazi Observer article from 2017 asked, the 
question is how much the country really has developed in the 20 years that have passed. The present 
economic policy is still centred on achieving growth through openness toward foreign investments in 
the country and on building export oriented industries. The lack of Swazi participation in economic 
growth and development is blamed on the Privatisation Policy and empowerment laws and Bills are 
mentioned, which are allegedly “piece meal” and unable to engage local businesses (unknown author 
2017 – Swazi Observer). 
 
The economic goal of the Swazi government has been to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and later the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) through economic growth. Thus far, 
economic growth has been pursued through local industries partaking in multinational companies’ 
global value or supply chains. These strategies focused particularly on the improvement of the 
garment sector and the benefit from the special export conditions under the AGOA agreements. In 
line with the discussions above in the working paper, this however has led to a focus on a single sector 
which again hassled to further fragility of the country’s economy as witnessed with the changes in 
the conditions of the garment industry before and in particular after 2005 (Madonsela 2006, Staritz 
& Frederick 2016).   
Ownership structures 
The land ownership structure in Swaziland is built around two types of land. The Swazi nation land 
is administered in such a way that the king formally owns the land of the nation. The management of 
the land is allocated to the chiefs who give out usufruct rights to Swazi families for agricultural 
purposes for instance. The other form of land is the title deed land where commercial farms and 
industries can operate (Swazi Government – www.gov.sz).  
 
Foreign ownership of almost all of the garment factories has meant that strong relations with the home 
country are maintained, and that most of the inputs used in production are sourced from abroad. 
Though, some fabric is produces locally and some other types of input are sourced locally. The 
sourcing takes place through either RSA or Mozambique by the foreign owned companies. Both the 
Taiwanese and the RSA companies source most of their inputs from Asia (China or Taiwan), which 
means that there is limited spill over to the domestic industry (Madonsela 2006). 
b. Industrial sectors 
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Apart from garments, the key economic sectors in Swaziland include the sugar production sector, the 
beverage industry, the wood production sector and the tourism sector. The first three industrial sectors 
are mainly producing products for exports, though more secure options for income are being 
developed (i.e. the tourism sector).   
 
The major export markets for the garment industry are South Africa and the USA. Exports to the US 
is carried out under the conditions of the AGOA-SP. Swaziland’s definition as a less-developed 
beneficiary allows exporters access to the US market under the conditions in the AGOA Special 
provision (SP). This allows Swaziland to source goods manufactured in third countries, use them in 
the garment industry and export them quota and toll free to the US market. As mentioned above, 
AGOA was set to end in 2004, but was extended to 2008. Several of the least developed countries 
have had their SP permission renewed until 2012 under the AGOA conditions. This expired in 2015. 
Swaziland however lost AGOA eligibility in 2015 with the US because of failure to respect human 
rights issues but was reinstated in 2018. The SP permission is however under pressure from AGOA 
countries not benefitting from the SP, such as Mauritius and South Africa and from African producers 
of apparel otherwise sourced from third countries under the SP. 
 
Although there is a general lack of spillover effects from foreign investments in the garment industry, 
several small-scale spill-over effects have been identified. Due to the focus on export markets and the 
government’s desire to spread the activities out to the rural areas, substantial infrastructural projects 
have been undertaken to provide the sector with access to roads and trains. Several transport operators 
have also benefited of the increased transport of both goods and personnel to the factories.  
(Madonsela 2006: 252). 
 
Swaziland (as part of SACU) entered a trade agreement5 with MERCOSUR on April 1st 2016, 
providing SACU members access to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay. Both parties offered concessions on more than 1.000 tariff lines with preference 
margins ranging between 100 – 10 percent (The Department of Trade and Industry 2016). After its 
exclusion from AGOA in 2016 the MERCOSUR-SACU agreement offered the industry a “lifeline”. 
(The Department of Trade and Industry 2016). Swaziland further aims at gaining preferential access 
to the markets of the EU and is currently in the process of ratifying the EU’s trade and development 
agreements, i.e. Economic Partnership Agreement (Swaziland Revenue Authority 2018 – 
 
5 Please refer to the Swaziland Revenue Authority’s (SRA) website for full details on the SACU-MERCOSUR trade 
agreement as well as the SADC - EU Economic Partnership Agreement: http://www.sra.org.sz/customs/free-trade-and-
preferential-agreements.php 
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www.sra.org.sz). Under this agreement, the EU guarantees SADC members Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland free access to its market and will remove duties on 98.7 
percent of imports from South Africa. The SACU, in turn, removes duties for 86 percent of imports 
from the EU (EU accepts asymmetric trade conditions, i.e. asymmetric liberalization) (European 
Commission n.d.).  
 
Trade and Production: 
Although Swaziland has had a deficit on its trade balance since 1978, in 2013 Swaziland recorded a 
trade surplus of 0.05 billion USD. Since then, the country has recorded a trade surplus up to 0.37 
billion USD in 2015. This however fell to 0.19 billion USD the following year (see figure 3 below).  
 
Figure 3: Export of goods from 2007 to 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars) 
  
Source: WTO (2018) In Statista - The Statistics Portal. 
 
In 2017, Swaziland exported USD 2.02 billion, making it the 147nd largest exporter in the world (The 
World Factbook). The main products exported are essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries (30 
percent), sugar and sugar confectionery (21 percent), miscellaneous chemical products (17 percent), 
garments (6 percent) and wood products (4 percent) (Zimtrade 2016).  
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Figure 4. Import of goods from 2007 to 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: WTO (2018) In Statista - The Statistics Portal. 
 
The imports into Swaziland are a bit lower compared to the exports. In 2017 Swaziland imported US$ 
1,62 billion worth of goods (WTO 2018). The main goods that were imported in 2017 were mineral 
fuels (11 percent), Vehicles and parts thereof (7 percent), and Machinery and parts thereof (6 percent) 
(ITC 2018). In the case of imports, the depreciations of the domestic currency have on several 
accounts meant that the imported products have become more expensive. This e.g. contributed to the 
increase in value of imported goods measured in the domestic currency in the mid 2000s (Central 
Bank of Swaziland 2007/2008).                     
 
Swaziland’s main trading partners are South Africa, China and Mozambique. Swaziland imports 60.3 
percent of all its goods from South Africa, 5.3 percent from China and 5.1 percent from Mozambique. 
The main export destination of Swazi products is South Africa, receiving 69.4 percent of all exports 
(see figure 5 below), which makes Swaziland very dependent on the economic situation and 
development of the South African economy. Kenya receives 5.9 percent and Mozambique accounts 
for 6.2 percent of exports coming from Swaziland. The US accounts for 0.8 percent of all exports in 
terms of value (ITC 2018). 
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Figure 5.  Country shares in value of Swaziland's exports (% in 2017) 
 
Source: ITC (2018) In Trade Map – International Trade Statistics. 
 
The total debt to GDP ratio in March 2016 was recorded to be 16.2 percent. Although this number is 
below the international threshold, it is nevertheless higher than the ratio of 12.9 percent it was in 
March 2015. The increase mainly reflected an increase in external debt with the ratio standing at no 
less than 9.9 percent, all while the domestic debt was found to be 6.3 percent. Foreign debt has also 
continued to increase, and constituted about 61 percent of the total debt (Kariuki & Kannan 2017). 
c. Labour market 
 
Manufacturing accounts for 19.5 percent of all employment. Other sectors are wholesale and retail 
(15.4 percent), agriculture, forestry and fishing (10 percent), real estate, renting, and business 
activities (7.5 percent), education (7.4 percent), what is classified as other community, social and 
personal service activities (11.3 percent) and all other industries (28.9 percent). The survey also 
revealed that 21.3 percent of all workers in the manufacturing sector could be classified as part of the 
informal sector. 
 
As mentioned in section 1, the garment industry is one of the key sources of employment in the formal 
sector. Due to the fluctuations in the industry, the level of employment has shifted, e.g. from the peak 
in 2004 with around 40.000 employed, to approximately 18.000 workers in 2008 (at the time when 
we conducted our first interviews (September 2008), to present an estimated 12-13.000 employed. 
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Swaziland’s official unemployment rate in 2017 was 26.4 percent. Unemployment has been fairly 
stable since 2007 where 28.2 percent of the population was unemployed (World Bank 2018). 
However, unemployment figures are said to be problematic for a number of reasons. According to 
the country’s first labour force survey, the Integrated Labour Forces Survey (ILFS), which was 
conducted in 2013, concluded that the country had a total working age population of 585,872 
individuals. The survey shows that the total labour force is 295,237 individuals (or 50.4 percent)6. Of 
those in the labour force, 71.9 percent are employed, and 28.1 percent are unemployed – accounting 
for 212,131 and 83,105 individuals respectively. Of those who are out of the labour force, 
approximately 290,637 individuals (or 49.6 percent), 23.7 percent are classified as discouraged 
workers, and 76.3 percent are classified as “others out of labour force” (see appendix 1). However, 
as previous reports indicate, many workers in a country with a relatively small formal sector such as 
Swaziland do not actively seek employment because they do not believe that jobs are available (ILFS 
2007). As such, they are classified as discouraged workers.  
 
The (ILFS) report works with official and relaxed definitions of employment. This means that for the 
relaxed definition, those who are classified as discouraged workers, are added to the unemployment 
rate. It is also important to note that the definition of employment is somewhat liberal – a person is 
classified as employed when he or she “[d]id at least 1 hour of work during the reference week [the 
week before the interview] for pay, profit, barter, or home use in a wage and salary job, in his/her 
own enterprise or farm, or as an unpaid family worker in a family-owned enterprise or farm” or 
“[t]hose persons who were temporarily absent from their jobs to which they will return due to illness, 
bad weather, vacation, labour-management dispute or personal reasons.” However, “unpaid family 
workers temporarily absent from work” were “considered economically inactive” by the report (ILFS 
2007: 17-18). If one adds discouraged work-seekers to those classified as unemployed, the “relaxed” 
unemployment rate adds up to 38 percent of the economically active adult population (in 2013). 
 
Wages 
The basic minimum wages in Swaziland are set and controlled by the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Employment. The ministry sets down wage councils to decide the minimum wage in the 11 different 
categories of industry or trade. The council is made up by representatives from the employers, the 
employees and the government. 
 
6 Defined as those aged 15 and over. 
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Regulation of wages in the garment industry is set by the Manufacturing and Processing Industry 
Legal Notice no 149 of 2002. As per 2017, there are seven categories. The basic wage for a learner 
(category 1 rate) in the sector is 262.7 Emalangeni (US$ 22.5) per week. For category 2, such as a 
packer and a sorter, the minimum wage is set at 351.35 (US$ 30) Emalangeni. For the mid-categories, 
the wage ranges from 387.2 to 476.9 Emalangeni (or US$ 33 to US$ 40.7). For the very skilled person, 
the wage is between 543.35 to 562.35 Emalangeni (US$ 46.3 to US$ 48) per week. The supervisors 
are set to earn minimum 25 percent above the highest paid worker (Ministry of enterprise and 
employment 2002. As seen on http://www.gov.sz/home.asp?pid=2675 the 7. April 2009; Simelane 
2017).  
 
Although the minimum wage has been adjusted in the last couple of year, the average inflation rate 
of 9.42 percent from 1967 to 2019 has made it very difficult to live in the country (Trading Economics 
2019). Furthermore, several of the textile and clothing companies have over the years expressed that 
they expect to be exempted from the minimum wages regulations in order to keep their investments 
in Swaziland. This put heavy pressure on the minimum wages as e.g. reported by Madonsela (2006). 
In 2017 the Swazi government approved a salary increase for workers in the garment industry of 18 
percent, bringing the minimum wages up to US$ 18.7 to US$ 40.1 (depending on the category of the 
worker) (APA News 2017). However, workers (through trade union TUCOSWA) were demanding 
up to a 100 percent increase. Unions were encouraged to bring this demand to the table by the words 
of the US Ambassador to Swaziland Lisa Peterson’s after Swaziland was reinstated as AGOA 
beneficiary. Peterson said that “the country should strive to ensure fair labour conditions and safe 
workplaces” (Zwane 2018). The Swazi Labour Law includes the eight ILO core conventions. The 
problem is, however, - as had been outlined earlier on - that the execution of the labour law is not 
enforced adequately due to the fear of losing foreign investors. Another important element to 
remember is that the minimum wage laws do not apply to the informal sector, where many workers 
are employed (AllAfrica 2018).  
 
Unions 
Unions in Swaziland are highly politically involved. As political parties are banned in Swaziland, and 
unions were too until 2006, the unions have been engaged in political activities striving for democratic 
reforms. As an example of the broader demands politically, the trade unions’ agenda has also included 
advocating the government to supply the population with free transport and affordable housing, 
mainly because the minimum wages are not high enough to maintain reasonable living conditions. In 
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2011 for instance, Swaziland only had 26 registered trade unions (Ulandssekretariatet 2013). As the 
unions are the main opposition to the rule of the king, this has led to harassments and disturbance of 
unions’ work. In contrast, foreign garment companies have been viewed as ‘friends of the king’. 
Hence, the unions have faced a number of challenges. 
 
At the national level, a recent attempt to strengthen the unions by forming one main body TUCOSWA 
(Trade Union Congress of Swaziland) was ruled to be illegal by the Swazi courts. Until then, most of 
the Swazi trade unions were cooperating in the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), 
headed by Jan Sithole. The organisation was officially established in 1983, and was at that time 
illegal. The organisation approximately has 83,000 members. However, other unions were affiliated 
with SFU. While one of Swaziland’s biggest and most powerful unions under the SFTU were the 
Swaziland Manufacturing Allied Workers Union (SMAWU). The union represented the highest 
amount of garment workers and is headed by Justice Thintitha Mthethwa, then also SPRAWU 
organised garment workers. Both unions had their main priorities on topics like wages, working 
conditions and unfair dismissals. Furthermore, a system of seniority is wanted where workers, who 
have been employed for a longer time, should receive a higher payment compared to newly hired 
workers. 
 
One challenge is that the unions need to represent 50 percent of the workforce in a workplace to 
ensure recognition by the factory management. This is almost impossible to achieve, and recognition 
is therefore in many cases up to the goodwill of the individual factory owner. In addition, different 
unions have attempted to organize workers in the garment industry leading to internal competition 
further weakening the chances of reaching 50%’s representation.  
 
Another challenge has been the policies and initiatives from government and parastatals (SIPA). In 
our communication, SIPA representatives argued against the trade union’s demands for a higher 
minimum wage as this was viewed to diminish the competitive advantage on a global level of the 
companies operating in the country. Furthermore, no unions were allowed in the SEZs when these 
zones were established. As Vincent Dlamini, the union representative, stated: “our main objective is 
to ensure, as workers, that we are properly governed because we are citizens first before we are 
workers (Clottey 2009). 
 
Various international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and unions from Europe and the US 
have over the years engaged in the situation in Swaziland. One example is the American Unions 
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centre AFL-CIO, which has helped to pressurize the government to improve labour legislation. 
International cooperation has helped the Swazi unions in several occasions, including solving 
problems with factory owners and by helping the local unions with education and training. The main 
international unions helping the Swazi unions are Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (SACTWU), International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF). 
 
Finally, the factory management – the employers’ side – has shown limited forthcomingness in terms 
of taking up communication, consultation and negotiation. The Taiwanese companies have been most 
confrontational while the RSA firms have been less so. Furthermore, the language barriers with the 
Taiwanese owners have caused problems for the unions. After legalizing the unions in 2006, some 
attempts were taken to learn from experiences and bring the relationship between unions, companies 
and government forward. During 2008, a delegation of people with relation to SMAWU, STEA and 
the labour department of the Swazi government, went to visit its counterparts in Lesotho. The trip 
was prepared to gain hands-on experience in how the tripartite system of resolving industrial disputes 
has worked for The Basotho counterparts, as it was evident that the Swazi garment industry suffered 
from more severe industrial unrest than the Basotho industry (Zwane 2008). However, no concrete 
steps were taken to implement such procedures in Swaziland. 
 
Another example of the challenges of the unions was the heavy disputes between the management of 
garment factories and its workers which resulted in the mass firing of all the employees after an illegal 
strike in the factory of Juries factory in Nhlangano. The workers had a number of complaints to the 
management’s treatment of the workers and went on an illegal strike. It is in fact almost impossible 
to strike legally as the limit for announcing a strike is no less than 74 days. Some of the workers 
complained that there was lack of permanent employment contracts and leave pay. Others complained 
that they wanted to be examined by doctors of their own choice and that they wanted to be able to eat 
food inside factory premises. When the management failed to react to these demands the workers 
decided to start illegal strikes. Finally, the management saw no other way than to fire all the 
employees who had participated in the strike. The SMAWU Union complained that the management 
had not used the normal procedure for handling industrial disputes, but had instead acted in an 
unreasonable way (Dlamini 2008).  
 
Moreover, as mentioned by most observers, there has been severe limitations in the commitment from 
factory owners to live up to the labour standards and minimum wages of the country. There have been 
some attempts to use contracts e.g. between SMAWU and STEA to settle on improved working 
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conditions for the workers. These contracts were set to last until June 30, 2009. But due to 
disagreements inside STEA between the Taiwanese and the RSA companies, in particular about the 
way the contracts should be used and the importance of cooperation with the trade unions, STEA 
could not come to a joint position and eventually split up in two fractions. Consequently, no 
agreement was reached and no improvement of the working conditions achieved. 
 
The current situation in the industry is also still very challenging. In March 2012, TUCOSWA was 
established as a merger between Swaziland's main trade unions, SFTU, SFL and SNAT. The union 
represents around 34,904 members, and is led by Secretary General Vincent Ncongwane. However, 
although the merger was a way to strengthen the country's trade union movement, so as to better meet 
workers' expectations, only a month later the government, and later the Industrial Court, de-registered 
TUCOSWA, making it illegal. The official reason behind the deregistration is that the labour law 
cannot accommodate the merger. But given that the new trade union is taking a resolution to call for 
free and fair elections in Swaziland - including unbanning of political parties - it is more likely that 
the deregistration is associated with the union's strong political involvement. Only after significant 
international pressure, TUCOSWA has received its registration again. This proves that the industry 
is still facing some of the same challenges as it was years ago.  
 
All in all, the unions have experienced major obstacles in their work and registered limited progress 
with regard to their demands. 
3. POLITICAL & SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND POVERTY 
 
a. Brief history 
 
The country regained its independence from Britain in 1968 after being under colonial rule for more 
than 60 years. At that time, a constitutional monarchy was in place and the political party, Imbokodvo 
National Movement, was in control of all the electable seats. In the nation’s second election, the 
opposition party Ngwane National Liberatory Congress won 20 percent of the votes. The presence of 
the opposition party made the king dissolve parliament and take full government control over the 
nation, forbidding all political and trade union activities in the country. The political system was 
restored in 1979, with a parliament formed by representatives who were partly elected indirectly, and 
partly appointed by the king himself. This system was changed in 1993 after demands for democratic 
reforms to a system of both direct and indirect representatives in the parliament.  
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b. Description of the political system and administration 
 
The political system is a monarchy with the executive power resting with king Mswati III. He 
functions as the head of the state, while the Prime Minister Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini acts as the 
head of government and a cabinet appointed by the king at the recommendation of the prime minister. 
The legislative power rests with the parliament formed by the House of Assembly and the Senate. 
Although the two chambers sit separately, all Bills must be passed by both chambers and receive the 
Royal Assent. The House of Assembly consists of 65 members. The 55 members of the House of 
Assembly are elected, and 10 are appointed by the king. The 55 elected representatives are elected as 
local representatives in the local tinkhundla centers, and not as political party representatives since 
political parties are illegal. The tinkundla system means that government representatives are elected 
on the basis of the system of traditional rules, which runs alongside hereditary traditional leaders 
(indvunas) who are in reality appointed by the king. The representatives are elected for a 5 year 
period. The last election was held on August 18 and 21 September 2018. The Senate consists of 30 
members, with 10 members appointed by the House of Assembly and the remaining 20 by the king. 
The king appoints the executive authority (European External Action Service 2013)7. 
 
Administratively, the country is divided into 4 regions, 9 municipal governments and mentioned 55 
tinkhundla centers. Under the Local Government Act, responsibility for urban local government rests 
with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, which has power to define urban areas; while 
responsibility for rural local government rests with the Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and 
Development. As a consequence of the national decentralization policy in 2016, the municipalities 
now hold revenue-raising and budget-seeking powers – all while the tinkhundla centres operate with 
direct funding from the government. The responsibilities of the local government is widespread, 
including town planning, waste management, environmental protection and, water and sanitation 
(CLGF 2017-18). 
 
Taxes 
Income taxation was first introduced in Swaziland in 1921. The personal income tax system is 
progressive with tax rates from 0 percent up to 33 percent depending on the income. Since 2014, 
Swaziland has decreased its corporate tax rate to 27.5 percent. However, the government can classify 
certain operations as “essential for the development of the country”, which means that such 
corporations pay a tax rate of 10 percent for a ten-year period. In addition, corporations involved in 
 
7 See also http://www.gov.sz/index.php/component/content/article/93-parliament/parlimanet/370-parliment 
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exports have duty free access to capital goods, raw materials and can repatriate their profits without 
having to deal with exchange controls. Furthermore, there are no taxes on dividends from companies 
paid to residents of Swaziland and no estate taxes are paid. Swaziland has operated with a standard 
rate of sales tax of 14 percent since 2012, which is an increase of 2 percent since 2003 (Trading 
Economics 2018b). The sales tax was replaced by Value Added Sales Tax (VAT) in April 2012. It is 
administered by the VAT Act No. 12 of 2011 as well as the VAT Regulations of 2012. VAT is tax 
that is charged on the consumption of goods and services in Swaziland and on the importation of 
goods and services into Swaziland and continues to be 14 percent. Alcohol and tobacco have higher 
sales taxes, and various necessity goods like fresh food, drugs, medicines, furniture, and building 
supplies are exempted from the sales tax.  
 
In 2006/2007 the tax income was E 2,195,492 million Lilangeni (the equivalent of US$ 154,418 
million) (see appendix 2). This is a significant increase from E 425.518 million in 2000 (the equivalent 
of US$ 29,934 million) (OECD Stat 2018 – www. stats.oecd.org). The income from customs, excise 
and trade was E 6,112 million (the equivalent of US$ 430 million), which is an increase of 57 percent 
from the year before. This is mainly due to an increase in the receipts from the custom union (SACU). 
Swaziland forms part of the SACU, and there is a custom union of free trade between the member 
states where common duty tariffs and rules are applied. The introduction of a similar regime of duties 
and tariffs was introduced to facilitate easier sourcing from member countries of those raw materials 
used in the manufacture of goods that are meant for the export market. The customs and excise duties 
are pooled and afterwards shared among member states. 
 
Imports originating from outside the SACU are subject to an import duty. The tariff varies on different 
product categories. VAT is also payable on imports both from SACU and elsewhere8. All imports 
sourced for use in the manufacturing of goods for export are duty free. An attempted specification of 
revenue from custom duties can be seen in appendix 2.  
 
The total income from customs duties is much higher than the income from personal and corporate 
taxes as well as VAT. The total revenue of the government, including grants was in 2015/16 of 14.452 
million emalangeni. As public expenditures have not followed the same increases over the last years 
(see appendix 3), Swaziland has managed to change yearlong deficit to a surplus of E4.3 billion in 
2015.  
 
8 See also http://www.sra.org.sz/customs/swaziland-customs.php  
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Infrastructure (roads, electricity supply, water supply and waste management) 
The infrastructure in Swaziland is far from as developed as the neighbouring South Africa. Only 3000 
kilometres of the road network, representing 28 percent of the entire network, is paved. The rail 
service in the country is used to transport goods solely. The rail system is connected to Mozambique’s 
rail system and provides access to international harbours. A heavy duty rail line that goes directly 
from Mpaka to South Africa was established in 1986.  
    
Swaziland’s financial infrastructure has various deficiencies. The level of savings (public and private) 
has been insufficient in order to finance new investments. The government has provided very limited 
funds for investments. The cost of capital is too high due, given very high interest rates and the access 
is limited which restricts private household and smaller firms from borrowing funds. The formal 
banking sector is characterized by the ‘usual’ developing country one-sided focus, only prioritizing 
larger business, including the ones in export industries. The situation has led to increased investment 
of domestic savings in neighbouring South Africa. The limited scope and depth of the banking system 
has also resulted in an increase in the number of informal non-bank financial institutions such as 
savings and credit cooperatives (so-called termed micro-finance institutions). This sector fills the 
needs of the many Swazis abandoned by the formal bank sector (IMF Survey Magazine 2008). 
  
Electricity Supply 
From a policy and regulatory point of view, the electricity supply industry in Swaziland has 
undergone major changes, including changing global trends towards liberalized energy markets, 
affordability, energy efficiency and the security of supplying it. While the electrification rate of 65.79 
percent (61.2 percent in urban areas, and 82.8 percent in rural areas)(see figure 6 below) in Swaziland 
is higher compared to some of its neighbouring countries, it is nevertheless still very reliant on 
importing its electricity (Electricity Sector, n.d.). Swaziland imports close to 80 percent of its 
electricity from South Africa. The rest of the energy is produced by diesel and hydropower. Both 
diesel and coal for energy production is imported from South Africa. At rural levels, most of the 
energy is produced from wood (and charcoal). Even though a relatively small number of the 
population has access to electricity (see figure 6 below), the demand is exceeding the supply: the 
consumption in 2016 was 1.432 billion kWh, whereas the production was only around 381 million 
kWh – a shortfall of 1051 million kWh (The World Factbook 2018). 
 
The country is also currently inviting companies all over the world to develop renewable energy, 
particularly power from solar, wind and biomass. 
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Figure 6: Access to electricity (% of population)
  
Source: The World Bank 
 
Water supply 
Swaziland has a lot of rivers flowing through the country, but droughts and poor rainfalls are 
compromising water and food supplies, crop production, and thus the livelihoods of the Swazi 
population. A recent report on the Humanitarian Needs in Swaziland states that 25 percent of the 
population were facing acute food and water shortage due to poor rainfall in the 2014-15 and 2015-
16 cropping season. These individuals were classified in the “people who need humanitarian 
assistance”-category. The government is actively working with private sector actors to supply water 
particularly to communities around farms. Yet, still more communities need the same support to 
survive from droughts, poor agricultural seasons, unforeseen weather conditions etc. (Humanitarian 
Needs Overview 2016). 
 
Water scarcity also put enormous pressure on the garment industry, as the industry is heavily 
depended on water. In fact, it takes up to 2.700 litres of water to produce only one T-shirt. It is 
therefore essential that the government has a good infrastructure for supplying water to both the 
industrial areas as to the population. 
 
Waste Management 
The increasing population, rapid urbanization, uncontrolled settlements, and high unemployment 
rates underscores the need for better urban basic services including solid waste management systems 
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in Swaziland. The company Envirowise Waste Management reports exporting around 30 tons weekly 
to South Africa to process the waste, which is about 10 percent of the total waste created in Swaziland 
each week (Simelane 2014).  
 
c. Social Systems and Poverty 
 
The social system, the level of poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic all have an impact on the 
conditions for the population and the options for the industry in the country. In Swaziland 35.1 percent 
of the population is under the age of 15. Moreover, the country has a very low life expectancy of 51.1 
years. The very high proportion of the population who are young puts considerable pressure on the 
educational system which is already under severe stress. Educational expenditures for instance 
constitutes 7.1 percent of GDP (The World Factbook 2018). Officially, 25.28 percent of the total 
population are unemployed. The rural population constitutes 78.68 percent of the total population, 
which means that both educational and healthcare systems need to be widespread in order to reach 
the population.   
 
Education: 
The educational system in Swaziland is managed centrally with all power and authority being held in 
the Ministry of Education and Training. However, each district has a Ministry of Education office 
that is headed by a District Education Officer who takes care of local issues and implements the 
central government’s policies. The literacy rate in Swaziland was reported to be 87.5 percent in 2015 
(The World Factbook 2018). In line with the former MDG goal 2 and present SDG goal 4, the 
government has attempted to maintain a system of universal primary education (UPE) for all citizens, 
despite the financial constraints, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the high levels of poverty in the 
country. Although the government has achieved some goals, such as increasing the participation at 
primary schools with 95.6 percent, strengthened the quality of primary education etc., the country has 
also encountered numerous challenges. In a report published by the Ministry of Education and 
Training, it was outlined that progress still has to be made, “as much as there has been progress 
towards the achievement of EFA [Education for All] goals, most of the goals have not been fully 
achieved. There are still gaps that need to be filled thus the country’s priorities and prospects beyond 
EFA 2015 centres around the unfinished business” (Education for All 2015: p. x).  
 
The state pays the teacher’s salary, but pupils and local communities pay for the maintenance of the 
buildings and students’ fees. The state has recently introduced systems of free textbooks for primary 
school pupils, and a system of bursaries for orphaned children. 20 percent of the national budget is 
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spent on the education sector (Ministry of Education – www.gov.sz/home.asp?pid=57). The student 
fee can be too high for many families, and, as a consequence, children are being kept out of the school 
system due to financial issues. The state is providing a 10-year system of 7 years primary education 
followed by 3 years of lower secondary education. Approximately 500 primary schools are spread 
out over the country. 
 
The secondary educational system is characterised by lack of funds. Moreover, most pupils have 
difficulties in passing from the low level of secondary school to upper secondary schools. Many 
parents also do not see the need for their children to continue with upper secondary school as only 15 
graduates are allowed to access into tertiary schools. The so-called “equal access policy” is therefore 
non-existent, and a mere elite class access is functioning at these levels. It is mentioned that an 
increased emphasis needs to be put on providing vocational training (Shabalala 2006). In terms of 
numbers, there are approximately 830 public schools in Swaziland, including primary, secondary and 
high schools. 
 
Apart from the official governmental educational system, many missionary schools are operating in 
Swaziland, mostly at primary school levels. Several projects by NGO also exist in the country, 
providing mainly adult education for illiterate or innumerate people.  
 
Regarding the Swazi textile and garment industry, there are no specific training centres in Swaziland, 
which large operations in the country consider an impediment to growth. Machinists are, therefore, 
trained on-the-job. Although the University of Swaziland does offer a B.S degree in Textiles, Apparel 
Design, and Management since 2013, the number of graduates has been limited so far (only 11 to 
date: 2016) (Staritz & Frederick 2016). In some instance, the GoS has requested assistance from other 
countries to provide training to students in areas such as sewing, mechanics, plumbing and electrical 
work, and computing. This is seen as essential to raise the quality of the country’s labour force. 
However, the lack of training records and evaluation is limited which makes it difficult to obtain the 
real outcome of such activities (ICDF n.d.). 
 
Health: 
The healthcare system consists of both a formal and informal provisioning. The healthcare sector 
builds on decentralisation and is formed by 7 government hospitals. The local healthcare system 
consists of 8 public health units, 12 health centres, 76 clinics and 187 outreach sites, all of these are 
governmentally operated. Swaziland spends around 3.8 percent of its GDP on health care of which 
60 percent comes from the Government, and the rest from funding, individuals, private sector and 
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development partners (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, n.d.). All governmental healthcare 
activities are managed under the ministry of health and social welfare. 
 
The non-governmental healthcare system consists of 2 mission hospitals and one industry supported 
hospital. At the local level, it consists of 73 mission health facilities, 62 private clinics and 22 industry 
supported health centres and clinics. This system is operated and paid partly by external organisations 
or companies, and partly by the individual users of the healthcare system. A higher degree of 
coordination between the different levels of healthcare, and the different sectors, are needed in order 
to achieve higher efficiency. Furthermore, the division of the healthcare system in public, private and 
missionary has caused a shortage of staff in the public sector and in rural areas (Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare 2008). The informal provisioning of health depends on the use of traditional health 
practises and traditional practitioners, while the formal sector uses the Western medicine and 
conception of healthcare. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Swaziland is suffering heavily under the HIV/AIDS epidemic and has one of 
the highest amounts of people in the population carrying the disease in the world. Official estimations 
show that 27.4 percent of the adult population was living with aids in 2017 (UNAIDS Data – 
www.unaids.org). In the context of the gendered distribution, 35.1 percent of all women are living 
with HIV, compared to 19.3 percent men. The high number of AIDS/HIV infections bear the main 
reason for the low life expectancy level of the population, but also tuberculosis and malnutrition 
affects the live expectancy level. The estimated life expectancy is currently 52.1 years. In 2017, 3,500 
people alone died from AIDS (Ibid.). The tendency is however that the life expectancy is increasing 
as more people get access to ART treatment. It was estimated that only 8,373 people out of the 36,500 
people needing ART treatment was receiving it. This means that an increased effort to provide the 
needed ART treatments could be beneficial to improve the general level of health in Swaziland (WTO 
2006). The recommended spending in order to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic is 15 percent of the 
national budget, which the present figures fall short of. 
 
The key objectives of the government’s health policy can be seen in appendix 4. One goal of the 
national health policy was to implement the MDGs, which Swaziland was not able to do. Now, the 
SDGs constitute targets to meet. The main challenge for Swaziland is the burden of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic combined with the lack of resources to effectively operate the healthcare system and provide 
the needed treatment and preventive measures. However, as mentioned earlier the government is 
taken serious measures to reach the SDGs. In a recent statement by Prince Hlangusemphi Dlamini, 
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the Prince stated that the country is particularly working to reach SDG goal 3 – ensuring healthy lives 
and promoting well-being for all at all ages – by ensuring that access to health care services is 
reachable for the population within a 8 km radius, by scaling up of the Prevention of Mother to Child 
Transmission of HIV virus, and by establishment of waiting rooms for pregnant women at delivery 
(HRH Prince Hlangusemphi Dlamini 2017).  
 
Poverty: 
In 2015, 39.4 percent of the population of Swaziland lived under the international extreme poverty 
line of US$ 1.9 per day. This is an improvement from 2011 where the extreme poverty rate was 42.0 
percent. There has been no improvement compared to 39.5 percent extreme poverty in 2014 and in 
2018, extreme poverty is projected to remain at 39.3 percent (see figure 7 below). The World Bank 
report expects poverty to grow in Swaziland due to the persistence of drought. Since the vast share 
of the population lives from agriculture, drought compromises water and food supplies, crop 
production, and thus their livelihoods (World Bank 2016). 
 
Figure 7 - Extreme poverty rates, Swaziland (1994-2018) 
  
Source: World Bank (2016) - Macro poverty outlook for Swaziland 
 
The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development has developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Action Plan (PRSAP) in order to eradicate poverty in the nation by the year 2022. The objective of 
the program is to reduce the prevalence of poverty to 30 percent by 2015 and to eliminate it 
completely by 2022 (Kunene 2015). The PRSAP is an operationalisation of the NDS, and includes 
specific actions to be carried out in order to foster economic growth and eradicate poverty 
(Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland 2007). A recent report by the United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework, writes a number of reasons for the persistence of poverty in 
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Swaziland, among others, the impact of HIV/AIDS, the global economic crisis, over-reliance on 
SACE revenues, and unfavourable social policies (UNDAF 2016-2020). 
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Appendix 1: Labour market indicators 
 
1a: Population and workforce 
Total population 1.3m (+/)  
Total working age population 585,872 100% 
Labour force (15 years and older) 295,236 50.4% 
Employed 212,131 71.9% 
Unemployed 83,105 28.1% 
Out of labour force 290,067 49.6% 
Discouraged workers 69,010 23.7% 
Others out of labour force 221,627 76.3% 
Source: ILFS 2013 
 
1b: Relaxed unemployment rates by region, 2007, 2010 and 2013 
Region 2007 2010 2013 
Hhohho 36.3 42.30 43.81 
Manzini 34.5 37.60 39.26 
Shiselweini 43.1 45.60 47.46 
Lubombo 45.2 40.90 39.08 
All regions 38 40.60 41.76 
Source: ILFS 2013 
 
1c: Official unemployment rates by region, 2007, 2010 and 2013 
Region 2007 2010 2013 
Hhohho 27.2 23.2 29.0 
Manzini 27.1 22.9 25.3 
Shiselweini 30 25.4 37.5 
Lubombo 31.8 24.3 24.8 
All regions 28.2 28.5 28.1 
Source: ILFS 2013 
 
1c: Official and relaxed unemployment rates by ecological zone, 2007 
 Official 
unemployment rate 
Relaxed 
unemployment 
rate 
Highveld 24.1 32.7 
Middleveld 28.3 37.1 
Lowveld 34.4 48.0 
Lubombo plateau 33.7 43.5 
Source: Brixiová et al. (2012) 
 
1d: Unemployment Rates in 2010 (% of labour force) 
 Regular 
definition 
Relaxed 
definition 
15-24 52.4 64.0 
25-34 30.5 40.7 
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35+ 16.0 28.6 
Total 28.5 40.6 
Source: Brixiová et al. (2012) 
 
1e: Official and relaxed unemployment rates by education level, 2007 
 Official 
unemployment 
rate 
Primary and below 34 
Secondary and high school 32 
University 10 
All levels 28 
Source: ILFS 2013 
 
1f: Employment by sector in 2014: 
Manufacturing 35% 
Wholesale and retail: 14% 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7% 
Real estate, renting, and business activities 6% 
Education 6% 
All other industries 32% 
Source: Central Statistical Office  
 
1g: Employment by occupation 
Elementary 26.2% 
Craft and related trades 18.7% 
Service, shop and market sales 12.1% 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 10% 
Clerks 9.6% 
Professions 7.6% 
All other occupations 15.8% 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
1g: Occupational Distribution (%) of employed persons 
Occupation Group Percentage  
Management 4.8 
Professions 12.6 
Technicians and associate professionals 3.8 
Clerical support workers 7.6 
Service and sales workers 22.1 
Skilled agricultural forestry fishery 
workers 
6.5 
Craft and related trades workers 14 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
8.7 
Elementary occupations 19.9 
Not stated 0.1 
All Occupations 100 
Source: ILFS 2013 
 
Employment status (%) 
 Male Female Both sexes 
Employee 79.7 77.9 78.9 
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Own account worker (self-
employed) 
15.6 16.6 16.1 
Employer 3.7 4.4 4.0 
Member of producers’ 
cooperative 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
Contributing family worker 0.9 1.1 1.0 
All employed 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 155,505 96,626 212,131 
Source: ILFS 2013 
 
Employment by sector (2007) 
Public:      19.6% 
Private formal:     53.9% 
Private informal:     17.7% 
Domestic households:       2.1% 
 
Informal sector by industry (2007): 
Wholesale and retail:     34.2% 
Manufacturing:     21.3% 
Construction:     12.1% 
Real estate, renting and business activities:     8.6% 
Other community, social and personal service activities:    8.8% 
All other industries:     14.2% 
 
Appendix 2: Central Governments Revenue (E’million); 2014/15 to 2017/18 
 
Source: 2017/18 Estimates Book, Ministry of Finance 
*Revised Estimate 
**Budget Estimate 
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Appendix 3: Governments Operations 
Source: Central Bank of Swaziland (http://www.centralbank.org.sz/about/annual/2016-2017.pdf) 
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Appendix 4: Key objectives of Ministry of health and welfare’s policy (from the National 
Health Policy. Ministry of Health and Social welfare. 2008) 
 
A. Health service delivery and interventions 
 
• Managerial performance 
• Balance between curative, preventive and health promotive services 
• Quality of services 
• Equitable distribution of services 
• Coordination of sectoral activities 
• HIV and AIDS 
• Environmental health issues 
• Decentralization of authority and decision making 
• The referral system 
• Supervision, monitoring and evaluation 
 
B. Resources for Health 
 
• Broadening the financing base for health services 
• Coordinating donor activities and resource tracking 
• Health and development 
• Utilization of available resources 
• Access to safe medicine and diagnostic technology 
• Transparency and fairness in training, appointments and promotions 
• Human resources for health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
